Have mob violence, bulldozer demolitions and public failures become normalised in India? What the evidence shows

A political post shared by Prashant Pundir on 20 October 2026 argues that a long list of violent acts, public disasters and abuses of authority has become normal under the BJP–RSS. Its examples run from mob lynchings and bulldozer demolitions to stampedes, bridge collapses, the public celebration of convicted rapists, mosque demolitions, police misconduct and restrictions on speech. The argument is not simply that these things happen. It is that repeated harm, weak accountability and public acceptance can make them seem ordinary.

There is a real factual basis for parts of that criticism. Courts have recorded serious abuses, official data documents preventable risks, and some high-profile responses have rewarded or excused wrongdoers. But the list mixes established incidents with broad interpretations and accusations that cannot be accepted without details. It also puts very different matters — a crowd disaster, a state demolition order and a criminal act by a private individual — under one political explanation. Each requires its own evidence.

Mob lynching and the duty to protect people

Mob lynching is not an invented problem. In Tehseen S. Poonawalla v Union of India, the Supreme Court issued prevention, investigation and victim-support directions in 2018. In February 2025, the Court again noted that its earlier directions remained binding, while directing people affected by specific cases to use available legal remedies. These rulings establish the seriousness of the problem and the duty of police and governments to act. They do not, without comparative incident data, establish that every lynching was orchestrated by the BJP or RSS, or that the offence did not exist before 2014.

Bulldozers used as punishment

The strongest institutional example is the use of demolitions against people accused of crimes. On 13 November 2024, the Supreme Court ruled that authorities could not demolish a person’s home merely because they were accused or convicted of an offence, and prescribed safeguards including notice and documentation, subject to stated exceptions. Punishing families and other occupants without due process is unjust and an abuse of public power, not a substitute for a court verdict. Governments have defended some demolitions as action against illegal structures, which is why the legality of each action and compliance with notice procedures must be examined separately. The judgment itself demonstrates that this was a serious enough practice to require national safeguards.

When convicted rapists were publicly welcomed

There is also a specific, documented example behind the criticism of honouring rapists. Eleven men convicted in the gang rape of Bilkis Bano and murder of members of her family during the 2002 Gujarat violence were prematurely released in August 2022 and publicly felicitated by local figures. On 8 January 2024, the Supreme Court cancelled the Gujarat government’s remission decision, finding an abuse of its authority, and directed the men back to prison. Celebrating people convicted of such grave crimes is morally indefensible because it humiliates survivors and undermines accountability. It would be wrong, however, to infer from that event that all supporters of a party endorse the act.

Stampedes and bridge collapses: real disasters, different causes

Official records confirm that these disasters occur. National Crime Records Bureau data compiled from its annual accident reports records 25 stampede cases and 30 bridge-collapse incidents across India in 2024. Such counts are important, but they must be compared across years and examined case by case before claiming that a particular government made them more frequent. Crowd control, inspection, engineering, contracting, emergency response and local administrative decisions can all be relevant. A disaster may reveal severe negligence, but occurrence alone does not identify who is responsible.

Mosques, police conduct and dissent

Demolitions of mosques have occurred, but the legal circumstances differ. For example, a Delhi Development Authority filing described the January 2024 removal of a mosque along with other religious structures from the Sanjay Van area, while courts have also upheld removal of particular unauthorised structures. Neither the existence of an order nor the government’s stated justification by itself answers whether a particular action was discriminatory. That question requires the land record, notice, treatment of comparable structures and court orders for the specific case.

Similarly, sexual violence or misconduct by police officers must be investigated and punished wherever evidence establishes it. The image’s general insult about police, and its suggestion that Delhi Police functions as a named vigilante organisation, are political allegations, not conclusions established by the material. Claims that RSS members have admitted violence or that religious figures are being protected also need named incidents, the actual statements and reliable records before attributing criminal conduct or organisational responsibility.

The blanket claim that reading Marx, Lenin or Mao is criminal is misleading. In a 2024 judgment concerning G. N. Saibaba and others, the Bombay High Court discussed the distinction between possessing ideological literature and participating in prohibited violent activity. India has had disputes over publications and security laws across different periods, but reading a political thinker is not, on its own, a general criminal offence. By contrast, takedown orders and social-platform restrictions are genuine areas of public debate; each must be distinguished from threats to life and examined under its own law and factual circumstances.

What can fairly be said to have become normal?

“Normalised” is a claim about how people and institutions respond, not a statistic established by collecting examples. Evidence for it would include repeated abuse after warnings, public praise for perpetrators, officials ignoring binding safeguards, weak investigation or recurring failures without correction. The Bilkis Bano felicitation and unlawful punitive demolition practices provide strong grounds for moral criticism. Courts intervening, survivors pursuing remedies and citizens publicly objecting are equally important counter-evidence to the notion that everyone has accepted these acts.

Historical comparison also matters. Communal violence, police abuse and deadly crowd accidents predate the present government. That history does not excuse recent wrongdoing. Equally, an incident during BJP rule is not proof of an RSS instruction, BJP direction or a trend caused by the party. Responsibility belongs first to the identifiable perpetrators, decision-makers and authorities who failed their duty; broader political responsibility must be shown through decisions, patterns, incentives or repeated failure to remedy known abuses.

Conclusion

The post’s broad accusation is not fully proved, but it is not baseless. Judicial findings concerning bulldozer punishment, the reversal of the Bilkis Bano convicts’ release, and official records of deadly public failures establish serious realities that deserve scrutiny. The strongest ethical conclusion is that cheering convicted rapists and destroying homes as punishment without due process are unacceptable abuses, regardless of party. The other claims demand more specific proof. A fair account neither treats every allegation as true nor dismisses evidenced injustice merely because the argument is political. The test is whether citizens are protected, perpetrators held accountable and institutions corrected after harm — across governments and over time.